
In a groundbreaking study of China’s ties with Pakistan, Andrew Small (Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the USA) provides an invaluable addition to advancing our knowledge of this relationship in this timely and informative book. The Epilogue in the updated edition covers developments over the last year, which Small sees as the “China-Pak Axis stepping out of the shadows further and faster than anyone had expected”.

The book offers insights, rarely written so authoritatively and in such detail, on Beijing’s close, secretive, and often opaque ties with Islamabad over decades, founded on a shared antagonism with India. In the author’s own account,

China’s backing to Pakistan has gone so deep that it was willing to offer the ultimate gift from one state to another: the materials that Pak nuclear scientists needed to build the bomb. Pakistan acted as China’s backdoor during its years of diplomatic isolation, the bridge between Nixon and Mao, and the front-line in Beijing’s struggles with the Soviet Union during the late stages of the Cold War.

Small traces the emergence of the Beijing-Islamabad partnership in the wake of the 1962 Sino-Indian war to the forging of an “all weather friendship” in which India has been the principal point of continuity. In his well-researched chapters on the genesis and evolution of these ties, he brings out the primacy of the India factor even as the Sino-Indian relationship has improved. Small brings into sharp focus some hitherto dimly known aspects concerning China’s involvement in Pakistan’s use of irregular forces as an instrument of military strategy as well as their teaming up to support insurgencies within India among the Nagas and the Mizos.

What comes out clearly in Small’s narrative is the unwavering Chinese support to Pakistan, and how India’s rise as a potential competitor has only reinforced the original rationale for its partnership with Pakistan. China would like to see the India-Pakistan relationship in a state of managed mistrust, where tensions can be navigated bilaterally, economic ties can flourish despite
political antagonism, and the risks of full scale war remain distant. In other words, it is a version of China’s own relationship with India.

At the same time, Small discerns limits to China’s backing for Pakistan on more than one occasion. Bhutto’s disappointing visit in November 1971 when China refused to move militarily against India was mirrored by Nawaz Sharif’s in 1999 during the Kargil crisis when he was advised in no uncertain terms to de-escalate the situation and pull back troops. But a seasoned observer will know that China held back against India not as a measure of restraint but because of its hard core pragmatism, which is in sync with its consistent policy of aversion to political exposure and never getting drawn overtly in internal affairs or bilateral conflicts. In the end, Small also concedes, Beijing’s message to Pakistan to stabilise relations with India is over shadowed by the fundamentals of its encouragement for Pakistan’s role in containing India.

Even though China and Pakistan have never been treaty allies, and their armies come from radically different traditions, China has spared no effort since 1971 in helping Pakistan to develop a set of military capabilities to ensure it will not meet the same fate again. In reality, Small concludes, “China’s greatest contribution to Pakistan’s security has never really been the prospect of an intervention on its behalf. Beijing gave Pakistan something far more important than that: the ultimate means of self-defence”.

Based on years of meticulous study of the subject, of examining the memoirs of the principal protagonists, and extensive interviews with a network of reliable expert sources in the political, military, and intelligence circles in both countries, Small sums up the nature of Sino-Pak ties as having geopolitics and arms at the core of their partnership, and nuclear weapons at the heart of their military relationship. His comprehensive narrative of the Chinese assistance for Pakistan’s nuclear capability and missile program is recommended as a must read to comprehend the unusual level of mutual trust that could only be built by the extent of collaboration between China and Pakistan in an area of significance and sensitivity as the two sides’ nuclear ties. In his review of Andrew Small’s book, A Strange Tale of Sino-Pak Friendship, Daniel Markey (John Hopkins School of International Studies) describes the China–Pakistan relationship thus: “China, the ultimate realist state, and Pakistan, the ultimate rentier state, have found mutual benefit from their decades of loosely coupled cooperation.”

The detail and the depth of dealings over the past several decades - that both sides have been adept at denying - should come as no surprise to the foreign affairs professionals and political analysts in the Indian sub-continent,
who have for long known of the essential bits and pieces of the Sino-Pak relationship. The significance of Small’s narrative is that it now provides an independent verifiable basis of the carefully calculated unwavering collaboration between China and Pakistan, in which both have benefited to the detriment of India and the region’s security.

The tale on Afghanistan as told by Andrew Small in the chapters on the Chinese War on Terror, Trade across the roof of the world, and Tea with the Taliban, are as instructive. They confirm China has been the only country besides Pakistan which has maintained a continuous relationship with the top leadership of the Taliban. This has included relief at the ousting of the Taliban in 2001, to a mixed feeling at their regrouping by 2006, to not wanting either the USA or the Taliban to win, to a phase of dealing with all sides. In 2011, everything started to change - from desultory participation to unprecedented activism in all international meetings and conferences. China has been more worried than Pakistan about the fallout of the lack of stability in Afghanistan in the post US pull out phase. It did not hesitate to air differences with Pakistan publicly which, until then, had been virtually running Beijing’s Afghanistan policy. Once convinced that the prospect of US withdrawal was real, there has been no stopping Beijing from positioning itself to influence what happens next.

Small’s historical account is useful as a stage setter for the present circumstances of China-Pakistan relations. What should be worrying India is Small’s assertion that China-Pakistan relations are today even more important than they have been before, and are set to become stronger. Contrary to a popular perception of a decline in Pakistan’s overall geopolitical significance (as compared to the time when it played a conduit to the Islamic world and a facilitator on the world stage), Small foreshadows a weightier role for Pakistan as the rising threat of Islamic militancy reshapes China’s approach in the region in pursuit of a westwards strategy and, ultimately, in its quest for a global power status. Thus, instead of being left behind as a quaint legacy of the bygone era, “Pakistan is a central part of China’s transition from a regional to a global one…and a beneficiary of the new China driven geopolitical and geo economic context”.

While India still provides the strategic glue, Small is convinced it is the dilemmas China is facing in Afghanistan and Pakistan that are now at the crux of this partnership. With the emergence of Pakistan as the principal connection for the Xinjiang extremists to international terrorist networks, and again as the country which will face the spill over of instability in Afghanistan, stabilising its western periphery has become a higher priority for Beijing.
This puts to rest all speculations about Chinese displeasure with Pakistani militants’ role in training and arming Jehadi Uyghur’s, and the irritants below the surface resulting in distancing between the two sides. Small believes that Beijing leans hard on Islamabad in private; but both sides are able to manage this biggest sore point for the sake of their geopolitical goals. It is also a sobering reminder to those who had felt encouraged by reports in the latter years of Hu Jintao’s Presidency to believe that a common concern on terrorism may lead to forging a common cause between India and China.

On first impression, the book’s subtitle “Asia’s New Geopolitics” seems misplaced to readers and reviewers alike. For one, the most obvious security issues that Beijing faces are to its east, and its strategic competition with the USA lies in the Asia-Pacific. Particularly exaggerated appears to be the emphasis on Pakistan’s role as a shaper of the new geopolitics since the latter is generally seen as a political lightweight in a region dominated by the major powers who have the clout, and wield influence as architects of the security and strategic dynamics of the region. However, Small’s point becomes clearer once seen in the geopolitical context of China’s grand strategy for its ambitious trans-regional economic plans, and its positioning for playing a key role in the Afghan Peace Process after the planned drawdown of US troops.

Small’s research shows that China’s attention is now moving away from the more traditional security dimensions of its relationship with Pakistan. Indeed, it sees Pakistan as being more at the heart of its grand scheme to extend interconnectivity throughout in its western periphery with massive state funded investments. In its lookout for countries which can be allies in facilitating its global projection of power, China clearly sees Pakistan as the one friendship over decades where it commands support from across the political spectrum and institutions of state, and has a base of public support that is a striking outlier in any opinion survey of how China is perceived abroad.

China is testing out Xi Jinping’s Flagship project in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), where it has pledged $46 billion over the next few years. Given the special relationship, China expects the Pakistani government and army to smooth out any complications coming in the way of a successful execution of the initiative.

This new dynamic implies new opportunities and new pressures on Pakistan to deliver on the ground. Herein lies the rub! Until now, it has kept its end of the bargain by delivering on promised deals through a host of clandestine and covert operations. The scale of Chinese investment in the
CPEC is inevitably leading to a more visible and demanding Chinese involvement in the execution of the massive project. With tens of billions of dollars in play, it is no longer the exclusive purview of a small set of security elites on both sides.

There are questions being raised in Pakistan for the first time on the implications of this unprecedented project, and there are veiled hints of an economic takeover like scenario in the country. There are also contestations among different provinces to get a slice of the economic corridor. From China’s perspective, it is the security of their plants and personnel which seem to need a deployment of escalating force levels. The author agrees that it will be an altogether different experience for both sides to make a transition to normal business, and come down from the “mythically elevated status of higher than the highest mountain”. China is also aware of the challenge of dealing with a country that is both the greatest source of terrorist threats and a crucial partner in combating it.

Based on past records of this resilient relationship, Small remains optimistic about the two sides’ ability to manage this round as well, and is ready to place a bet on the CPEC’s success, notwithstanding the numerous fault-lines inherent in the project, and the expensive failures of extensive efforts at building economic infrastructure and trade in the past.

What does all this portend for India? Extending his optimism, Small concludes that for all these investments to yield the desired results, Pakistan must be stable, and normalise its trade and political ties with neighbours. By this logic, relations with India may be the longer term test of Pakistan’s willingness to deliver an appropriate environment for China’s economic plans. China also knows that the greatest economic benefits from the corridor would accrue if Pakistan normalised its trade and other ties with India. This then could be the thin sliver of opportunity - even an unintended consequence perhaps - to introduce stability in India’s relations with Pakistan.

Logical as this inference may be, developments in the last one year demonstrate once again that this logic has not persuaded either China or Pakistan. The escalation of diplomatic and political offensives in recent actions show that, instead, both prefer to stay with the traditional approaches best known to them in dealing with India. While Small would like to be more hopeful, his own account does not suggest it is possible. By the end of the book, he himself remains convinced that the strategic value for China continues in its use of Pakistan as a force multiplier against India, whether for its balancing role in the region or in preparing for its global agenda.
The policy options for India could not be clearer. Today, facing a rising India and its rapidly growing ties with the USA and Japan, Beijing may seek to invest in improving relations with India. But this will not happen at the expense of Pakistan. And, if Small’s interpretation of recent moves by China is taken into account, it is going in the direction of further strengthening its partnership with Pakistan.

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Satish Chandra & Smita Tiwari (eds), *Insights into Evolution of Contemporary Pakistan*, (New Delhi, Pentagon Press, 2015), Pages: 207, Price: 544.00

Pakistan is an enigma, which has been unravelled by few and that too despite years of study and analysis. Over the years, change of rule in Pakistan whether it is authoritarian or democratic has had its own effect on the evolution of the state. This, though, is only one of the many factors that have contributed towards the evolution of contemporary Pakistan. Thus, post May 2013 elections in Pakistan, the Indian Council of World Affairs constituted a Core Group of scholars, diplomats and academics with the mandate of studying a range of factors, which would facilitate a better understanding of the evolution of contemporary Pakistan. At the end of their study, the Core Group put together an assortment of well researched articles into a book.

“Insights into Evolution of Contemporary Pakistan” is a collection of these articles on well thought out issues that concern Pakistan. The strength of the book lies in the subject matter of the articles as they are the heart and soul of it. Each of these important subjects reads as a separate chapter. It has been addressed by a well known specialist who has done complete justice to the subject that he/she has tackled. These subjects holistically cover the issues,
which are faced by the state of Pakistan today. Thus, by developing an understanding of these subjects, the reader would be able to better appreciate the evolution of contemporary Pakistan.

The first chapter deals with “Pakistan’s Politico-Military Dynamics” and has been written by Rana Banerji. It is the appropriate chapter to commence an understanding of Pakistan as it throws light on the eternal question of who really calls the shots in Pakistan – “The political setup or the military?” Through this chapter the author has meticulously traced the origin and subsequent build up of the Politico-Military dynamics in Pakistan. He brings out that the absence of a charismatic politician during the initial years of nation building resulted in this process being taken over by institutions such as the Pakistan army and the civil bureaucracy. Subsequently, this military-civil bureaucracy combine got a major boost during Gen Zia’s regime wherein, the military got involved in the governance of the country in a greater measure. As a consequence, “Mil-Bus (Military Business)” spread its roots and started getting involved in most aspects of the state’s functioning. Subsequently, over the years, “Politico-Military” relations in Pakistan saw a lot of strife and the author has shed some light on these by capturing the Nawaz-Musharraf sparring in detail. He, however, drives home the point that over the years, the Pakistani military has realised the need for limiting the influence of this all powerful civil-military bureaucracy (also known as “Aamriat” in local parlance). The same was evident from Gen Kayani’s Nov 2012 GHQ speech. This notwithstanding, he concludes that the Pak army still remains an organisation, which cannot be trifled with as it continues to have a large say in the nation’s running. Thus, he feels that any political incumbent (Nawaz Sharif in the present circumstances) would have to fathom out ways by which the Politico-Military relation can be best managed without ruffling the army’s feathers.

The second chapter deals with another important facet, which defines contemporary Pakistan, namely, “Pakistan’s Military Build Up” and has been written by Miss Shalini Chawla. The author has succinctly brought out the “Indo Centric” approach of Pakistan’s military build up and has been able to correctly analyse that the same is based on the three pillars of: i) Pakistan’s alliance with the US, ii) Growing Sino-Pak relationship, and iii) Financial autonomy of the Pakistani military. The author has traced the development of Pakistan’s military capability in great detail (equipment wise). While doing so, she has traced the origin of import of many of the defence equipment and deciphers their effect on the Pakistani military capability. Of particular significance is her elaboration on Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine. As per Chawla, this too is “Indo-centric”, but importantly, remains ambiguous till date. While
Pakistan has never holistically enunciated contingencies for the same, over the years these have been spoken of in terms of “Pre-emptive strike”, “Weapon of last resort” or “Flexible response”. In addition, with Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs) being thrown-in now, Pakistan has very rationally adopted the posture of irrationality.

While there is no debating the fact that for the survival of contemporary Pakistan its economy needs to stand up and be counted, Sushant Sareen in the third chapter “Pakistan’s Economy: An unviable State?” has argued that the same seems to be only remotely possible on account of it already being in a state of no return. By analysing large amounts of data through well compiled figures/tables, he has studied key indicators that affect the Pakistani economy and alluded that it has gone through repeated cycles of “Boom-Bust” wherein, the “Boom” is sustained largely on account of foreign aid while the “Bust” occurs on the lapse of the same. These cycles have been compounded by the non implementation of economic reforms and hence, the economy remains fragile and unable to sustain on its own. These cycles aside, what he finds particularly worrying is that the downturn in Pakistan post 2006/2007 continues despite significant amounts of foreign aid being injected into the economy. Thus, he alludes that the Pakistani economy is getting into a tail spin of no return. He has also lucidly analysed the structural problems of Pakistan’s economy and discussed issues such as “circular debt” of the power sector at great length. While doing so he has laid stressed upon the fact that, unless Pakistan addresses the structural problems inherent in its economy, quick fix solutions such as foreign aid would only delay the inevitable end.

Savita Pande has captured the essence of Pakistan’s dilemma in the fourth chapter titled “Identity Conflict in Pakistan: The Challenge of Ethno-Nationalism”. Through this chapter she brings out that though Pakistan was formed on the supposed identity of “Muslim nationalism”, its biggest irony remains that till date it has no identity of its own. Such an identity crisis stems from the fact that even though over the years Pakistan has had strong strains of ethno nationalism in terms of Sindhi, Pashtun or Baloch nationalism, these have been effectively suppressed and neutralised by an insecure state by the superimposition of a perceived Islamic identity. Thus, Pakistan’s Catch 22 situation is that while on the one hand it continues to search for an elusive national identity, on the other it suppresses existing ethno national identities by the superimposition of a religious identity, which no one relates to.

The last but by far the most relevant chapter is authored by Alok Bansal and deals with the malaise of “Radicalisation in Pakistan”. In this chapter the author has traced the evolution of Pakistan into a radical Islamic state and
asserts that this is not necessarily what its founders had planned for it to be. By listing out important events the author has elaborated upon how a moderate state metamorphosed into a completely radical one. Watershed events in Pakistan’s radicalisation traced by him such as the 1974 introduction of “Taqfir” in the body politics of Pakistan, which led to the excommunication of Ahmediyas from the fold of Islam, as also the Islamisation of the Pakistani army by Gen Zia provide an interesting insight into why and how radicalisation gained roots in Pakistan. The author concludes by stating that the increasing Talibanisation of Pakistan and the deteriorating health of the Pakistani army (as proven by the PNS Mehran incident), which for long has been regarded as the last bastion of the Pakistan state, are ominous signs that point towards the impending crumbling of the state and this bodes ill not only for the safety and security of the region as a whole, but also for India in particular.

The book on the whole provides an excellent insight into what has led to the miserable state in which Pakistan finds itself today and is thus recommended as a must read for anybody who is dealing with or trying to understand the enigmatic and extremely unpredictable state of Pakistan.

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Vivek Chadha, *Even If Ain’t Broke Yet Do Fix It: Enhancing Effectiveness Through Military Change*, (New Delhi, Pentagon Press, 2016), Pages: 192, Price: Rs 795.00

Captain Basil Liddell Hart, one of the great military historians of the 20th century has stated, “The only thing harder than getting a new idea into the military mind is to get an old one out”. Change in any army is extremely difficult and happens often by compulsion. The Indian army has fought four wars and deployed in multiple insurgencies starting with Nagaland onwards. Having been continuously embroiled in conflict, the Indian army is often referred to
as an organisation that is “Forever in Combat”. The book brings out these aspects and relates the changes that have taken place in the Indian army and the difficulties faced in undertaking these actions.

The book has an introductory chapter, followed by eight other chapters and a concluding chapter. The main eight chapters are divided into three parts. Part I deals with ‘Conventional Threats’, Part II with ‘Military Change in Counter-insurgency’ and the last Part with ‘Analysing Military Change’. The first chapter includes a literature survey, which provides inputs of existing literature on the following subject of ‘Military Change’. Part I deals with Conventional Threats and has three chapters. Part II has four Chapters. Part III has one chapter. The last chapter contains Concluding Observations and carries a sample survey of retired and serving officers on issues related to the subject.

Military Change has been elucidated in Chapter 1 of the book referring to Grissom, Barry Posen, Stephen Rosen, Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff. The issues raised are adaptation, innovation and emulation. The best explanation is given by Farrell and Terriff, which is described as follows: “Innovation involves developing new military technologies, tactics, strategies and structures. Adaptation involves adjusting existing military means and methods. Adaptation can, and often leads to innovation, when multiple adjustments over time gradually lead to the evolution of new means and methods. Emulation involves importing new tools and ways of war through imitation of other militaries organisations. It is only when these new military means and methods result in new organisation goals, strategies and structures that innovation, adaptation and emulation lead to military change”. The book deals with the reasons why militaries change and relate the same to strategic culture, politics and circumstances. The changes could be top down or bottom up based upon the issue being addressed. Hereafter the book deals with the Indian army with case studies to clarify change in the Indian context.

Part I of the book deals with Conventional Threats. The first aspect pertains to the changes post 1962, the Sino Indian War and the Reforms post the General KV Krishna Rao report. Post 1962, three major changes were undertaken. The first was increase in strength from 5.5 lakhs to 8.25 lakhs. The second was raising a large number of mountain divisions and the third was raising a new Command Headquarters Central Command in Lucknow. Apart from this, great emphasis was laid on training which prepared India for the 1965 and 1971 Wars. The government appointed an expert panel, headed by General KV Krishna Rao, in 1975 to undertake a long term perspective plan for the army. The report led to the modernisation of the Indian army.
Reforms were undertaken when General Sundarji took over as the Chief of Army Staff in 1986. He provided the strategic moorings for employment of mechanised forces. He also facilitated the raising of the Army Aviation Corps, induction of 155 mm Bofors gun, raising of the Reorganised Army Plains Infantry Division (RAPIDs) with an enhanced component of armour and mechanised infantry. The army’s doctrine also changed from defensive deterrence to deterrence by punishment. The thinking became more offensive and a robust approach was adopted towards potential adversaries.

It was during this period while India gained conventional superiority that Pakistan initiated its process of acquiring nuclear weapons and delivery systems. Thereafter, the Cold Start or Limited Pre-emptive Offensive began post Operation Parakram in 2002. The issue of Cold Start was suitably deleted with a new Army Doctrine in 2004. However, Pakistan took the issue seriously and lowered its nuclear threshold by introducing Nasr, a 60 km Tactical Nuclear Weapon (TNW) to counter India’s conventional offensive. This part brings out clearly the need for the following to undertake successful military change:

- Long term strategic assessment
- Support from political establishment
- Visionary and committed military leadership
- Need for strong institutional structures
- Follow up action to take changes to their culmination

The book also points out the inability of the army to develop indigenous capability due to lack of an Army Design Bureau which the Indian navy has as a part of its establishment. The Indian army has done the needful and an Army Design Bureau was established on 31 August 2016. Further steps are being taken by the army to improve Professional Military Education of all ranks.

The Part II of the book deals with Military Change in Counter Insurgency (CI). CI operations present a contradiction for the conventional army and other security forces. The major issue is Actionable Intelligence, which is extremely important and difficult to obtain. The author has analysed 27 case studies. Annexure 1 contains the analysis and is important as it provides answers to the following questions:

- What has been the type of military change in CI operations in India?
- Has the change been top-down or bottom-up?
Was the change major or limited?

What were the drivers for military change?

What was its impact?

The author correctly emphasises the need for change in strategy while undertaking CI operations. The book traces operations from 1909 to the current date. He has explained the Iron Fist and Velvet Glove Strategy correctly. There is appropriate importance given to the balance to be maintained between Operations and Winning the Hearts and Minds (WHAM) of people. Further, the Doctrine for Sub Conventional Operations (DSCO) is explained lucidly. The army leadership reinforced insurgencies are a violent expression of political problems. The most important strategic decision taken in the fight against terrorism was the establishment of a fence along the Line of Control (LoC). It became operational in 2004 and has definitely helped in containing terrorism. The other significant step was the raising of 63 Rashtriya Rifles (RR) battalions for fighting militants in the hinterland. The proposal was approved in 1990 and currently they are a professional force that has mastered the art of CI operations. The third is reasonable integration of the security forces to meet the challenge of militancy. Though not specifically mentioned the buck stops at the Indian army. The junior leadership has been outstanding and despite officer shortages units have proved their worth in these operations.

A few other issues like forming an additional ad hoc company with the resources of the support company, ghatak platoons performing special tasks in an infantry battalion as also enhancement of the Army Commander’s Special Financial Powers to make speedy purchases are noteworthy changes. Apart from this, strengthening of vehicles, use of captured equipment, modification of Self Loading Rifle and employment of surveillance devices have paid rich dividends. The Indian army has been able to effectively cope with these changes effectively.

The Part III of the book is on Analysing Military Change. This has only one chapter- Contextualising Military change. Drivers of military change can be external and internal to an organisation. The most important driver is the strategic environment followed by technology and doctrine. In the case of CI operations political direction is also an important driver. The answer to the question as to who drives military change could include the government, mavericks, senior hierarchy of the armed forces and in the CI operations at the tactical level. Military change in most cases is evolutionary but the challenge to bring about revolutionary change is significant.
In the concluding chapter, the author points to the need for “Jointness” between the three services and the need for the army to form a part of the National Security Architecture. Further, the chapter deals with a survey undertaken by 53 serving and retired personnel from varying service brackets. The questionnaire given to the group was focussed towards strategic culture, professional military education, tactical adaptation, strategic innovation, professional development of the officer cadre, challenges to military change, sources of military change and importance of specialisation. This has resulted in 18 charts, which provide valuable inputs regarding various facets concerning military change. Overall the author commends the Indian army for undertaking a stupendous task. The higher institutions of the country must also deliver at the same speed.

The book’s focus commences from the Sino-Indian War of 1962, but military change for the Indian army actually commenced with the Indian independence. The major changes were the breakup of the Indian army into two parts and thereafter the new policies adopted by the Indian prime minister and the first war with Pakistan in 1947–48. The Indian army could have liberated Kashmir if there was synergy with the Government of India. The next aspect is that the 1965 war was another turning point for the Indian army. The defence of plains led to the creation of water obstacles system in the form of irrigation canals and ditch cum bandhs to stop mechanised spear heads making it extremely difficult to launch a breakthrough in the plains sector. Unlike its adversaries who have used air power and artillery against militants, India, as a policy, does not even consider such weapons. The book ought to have mentioned the Indian success stories in CI operations. Tripura, Mizoram and Punjab are fully integrated with the mainstream after undergoing insurgencies.

Overall, the book is well researched and various facts are well compiled. It is a must read for officials in the Ministries of Defence and External Affairs, strategic analysts and all serving and retired officers of the armed forces.

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