India’s Maritime Security Concerns and the Indian Ocean Region

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India is a maritime state with a long coastline of more than 7500 km and 274 islands that sits astride the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea, at the head of the Indian Ocean. The Indian sub-continent juts out nearly 1000 km into the northern expanse of the Indian Ocean like a wedge and splits this region into two distinct sub-regions.

As KM Panikkar had once said, “It is the geographical position of India that changes the character of the Indian Ocean”.1 India’s relation with the Indian Ocean is, therefore, a symbiotic one and history is witness to the fact that whenever India has neglected this huge body of water, it has lost its sovereignty, as was seen during the period of colonisation by the European powers. The Indian Ocean has a long history of carrying India’s foreign trade with recorded evidence stretching back to the 9th century BCE.2 Maritime trade still constitutes the backbone of India’s economy despite geographical shifts in the pattern of India’s trade. Considering that most of these commodities will have to come by sea, maritime security assumes an important dimension in India’s calculus for national development.

The success of recent government initiatives like the Prime Minister’s vision of Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) and the renewed emphasis on development of maritime infrastructure has to be underpinned by a guarantee of maritime security in our immediate neighbourhood. This essay will examine India’s maritime interests in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and understand the security concerns thereof. A glance at the existing maritime security frameworks in the IOR will then enable a better understanding of the responsibilities of maritime security of this region.

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India’s Maritime Geography

The Indian Ocean
The Indian Ocean is bounded by the Asian land mass in its northern reaches while the African continent serves to separate it from the Atlantic in the west. In the east, the Indonesian archipelago and Australia restrict its access to the Pacific while the cold continent of Antarctica provides the southern base. The sea borne shipping passages of the Indian Ocean are connected to the Pacific through narrow waterways in its southern and eastern reaches while the rather difficult passage around the southern tip of Africa connects it with the Atlantic. The Mediterranean and the continental hinterland of Europe are similarly connected to the Indian Ocean through the narrow passages of the Red Sea.

India in the Indian Ocean
India has an enviable geographical location as it sits at the head of the Indian Ocean, half way between these passages, allowing it to control these approaches and thence its trade. It is this quirk of tectonic evolution coupled with the meteorological phenomena of the monsoon and the trade winds that has given India a unique position in the history of economics and trade of the Indian Ocean. The history of the Indian Ocean is replete with stories of Indian and Arabian seafaring merchants trading to and from India with their ships borne on these winds. This geographical centrality of India also made it the base for expansion of the European colonial power to the Far East from the 16th and 17th centuries. The establishment of the Portuguese commercial empire in the Indian Ocean was facilitated by their base at Goa, which provided the springboard for the subsequent conquest of Malacca. This laid the template for the subsequent British rule over the Indian Ocean from Aden to India and thence to South East Asia.

Areas of Maritime Interest
The Indian Navy’s Maritime Security Strategy document is arguably the only such official document, which deals with the security of the maritime realm. It clearly enunciates India’s areas of maritime interest and categorises them as primary and secondary areas. The primary areas of maritime interest stretch from India’s coast all the way to the east coast of Africa including the Arabian Sea, the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman Sea. It also includes the Persian Gulf and the various choke points leading into the northern IOR.
secondary areas of maritime interest are further west and east of the primary areas and encompass the South and East China Seas as also the southern IOR and Antarctica.

**India’s Maritime Interests**

An understanding of the national maritime interests is important before identifying concerns of maritime security. A broad definition of maritime interests would encompass all those key areas of national endeavour in the maritime realm which are essential for the country’s survival and growth. Preservation of these interests is essential to national security and any threat to these areas of national endeavour needs to be closely analysed for formulating both, military and national strategies.

**Maritime Territory**

India has a huge coastline of about 7517 km and more than 1200 islands. Many of these islands are quite distant with the farthest of the A&N islands about 1600 km from the nearest mainland. India’s territorial sea has an expanse of 193,834 sqkm while the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) covers 2.02 million sqkm. The living and non-living resources in this zone, which measure about two-third of the landmass of the country, are exclusive to India, as also the trade and transport facilities that navigate through this area. This expanse is also home to 51 percent of India’s proven oil reserves and 66 percent of natural gas reserves. Protection and preservation of this natural resource not only implies ensuring its territorial integrity but also keeping it safe from predatory inimical entities.

**Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs)**

The importance of the Sea Lines can be gauged from the fact that the oceans supported about four fifths of the total world merchandise trade in 2014. Over the last decade, India’s seaborne trade has grown at twice the global growth rate of 3.3 percent, maritime container trade at 6.5 percent (higher than the world average of 5.4 percent over the past ten years) while cargo traffic at Indian ports has doubled to 1 billion tonnes per annum over the last decade (FY 2005–2015) and is expected to reach 1.7 billion tonnes per annum by 2022. This amounts to a total of 95 percent of India’s trade volume wherein lies the importance of the SLOCs and the International Shipping Lanes of the Indian Ocean in India’s maritime security calculus.
Maritime Economy

The Indian economy is hugely dependent on energy imports to the extent of 81 percent of the total domestic oil consumption in 2015-16. These imports are transported by sea while offshore oil gas production account accounts for 80 percent of all domestic gas production. Nearly 95 percent of India’s international trade by volume and over 70 percent by value is carried over the seas. India is also the world’s fourth largest producer of fish, most of which comes from the sea. This maritime economy is supported by an extensive network of 13 major and about 200 minor ports all along the coast. The Sagarmala project has provided a renewed thrust to port-led development and infrastructure for quick and efficient transportation of goods to and from ports. Nurturing this nascent maritime economy will require concerted national efforts whilst ensuring that impediments and potential threats are kept at bay.

Maritime Investments

India has invested in a variety of sectors like infrastructure, industry, energy, and services in a number of counties in the immediate maritime neighbourhood and beyond. India operates two research stations in Antarctica for conducting research in a wide variety of disciplines, most prominent of those being global climate change. India has made significant strides towards harnessing deep sea resources with the International Seabed Authority according it pioneer status and an allocation of 75000 sqkm of seabed in the Central Indian Ocean. ONGC Videsh Ltd has invested in oil exploration in Vietnam’s EEZ in two blocks allotted by the Vietnamese Government. China has protested against this activity deeming it to be illegal in the disputed waters of the South China Sea. While India still seems to be taking baby steps in this sector of the economy, it is important that this area of national endeavour be suitably encouraged whilst protecting it from being jeopardised by inimical interests.

Indian Diaspora

From time immemorial, India has had trade and cultural links with a number of countries in the IOR. The Gulf and Middle East region alone has in excess of 8 million NRIs employed in various sectors of these countries. Remittances from this Diaspora exceeded $ 100 billion in 2014. The unstable conditions in some of these countries have also prompted evacuation of our citizens during past crises as was witnessed recently in Yemen in April 2015 and from Lebanon in July 2006. Considering that many of these countries are coastal states, the safety and security of the Indian Diaspora residing there assumes importance in the maritime security framework.
India’s Historic Cultural and Trade Links in the IOR

India’s location in the Indian Ocean has placed it at the nerve centre of trade and cultural cross-pollination in this region throughout history. Historical evidence exists of Indian linkages with Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia and Mauritius with manifestations of Indian culture clearly seen in their temples and legends. Nurturing of these linkages is important for preservation of India’s interests in the region as these can directly impinge on the policies of these countries in particular and thereby the region at large. The Ministry of Culture launched Project Mausam in June 2014 to re-connect and re-establish communications between countries of the Indian Ocean world. It is intended to examine key processes and phenomena that link different parts of the Indian Ocean littoral as well as those that connect the coastal centres to their hinterlands. Focused efforts to further projects such as this and others like the Kerala government’s ‘Spice Route’ will strengthen India’s maritime interests in the IOR.

India’s Maritime Security Concerns

India’s maritime security concerns stem from the threats, largely in the primary area of interest of the Indian Ocean, which have a direct bearing on India’s maritime interests. While most of these threats also have a bearing on the other stake holders in the region, the impact on India will be greater considering India is ‘already assuming her responsibilities in securing the Indian Ocean region’. Threats, from inimical and potential adversaries to national interests in times of hostilities and war are not being considered here since they would fall under the realm of war fighting and will need to be addressed in a separate paper. Hence, this essay will restrict itself to threats to maritime interests in times of peace as also those, which affect the larger region in India’s neighbourhood.

Control of Choke Points

Access to the Indian Ocean is geographically controlled by a number of choke points leading to and from the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal, and from the Southern Indian Ocean, which are critical for safeguarding the Indian maritime interests. India is equidistant from most of these choke points allowing it to play a prominent role in the security of this huge maritime space. The Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s demonstrated the risks to Indian energy imports through the Straits of Hormuz. The Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb and the Gulf of Aden are similarly critical for security of energy flows. Incidents like the
attack on the French tanker *Limburg* when an al-Qaeda boat rammed the ship off Yemen in October 2002 can severely disrupt the Indian energy supply lines, which will directly affect the economy and have cascading effects on the shipping business.\textsuperscript{12} The Malacca Strait brings to mind the disruptive control the Dutch had exercised over the Indian Ocean trade in the 17\textsuperscript{th} and 18\textsuperscript{th} centuries. It is, therefore, very important that these areas remain free from the control of inimical interests and the free flow of seaborne traffic remains the norm. India has always been an equal if not vital partner to the world’s efforts in contributing towards the maintenance of freedom of navigation over these vital seaways. However, many of these regions are prone to bouts of instability, as has been witnessed in the recent past, which can then have a debilitating effect on regional as also global trade.

**Threats to SLOCs**

The SLOCs in the IOR have been susceptible to disruption by a variety of traditional and non-traditional threats over the years. However, India’s increasing dependence on the seas for its trade may necessitate intervention to protect these SLOCs from such threats. The cooperation of other states in the region as also from those outside the region is required to ensure the security of these SLOCs in this huge ocean space. India has been a pioneer in such efforts with the Indian Navy leading the way from 2002 when Indian ships escorted US flagged carriers through the Malacca Strait following the attack on USS Cole in Aden.\textsuperscript{13} The ongoing operation in the Gulf of Aden for the past decade where the Indian Navy has escorted ships of all nationalities epitomises these efforts.

**Regional Instability**

The Indian Ocean littoral, regrettably, has been witness to large areas of political instability in the recent past. The current situation in Yemen is one such instability. The rebels of the Free Aceh Movement in Indonesia have often targeted vessels carrying natural resource commodities such as oil, tin and aluminium, off the coast of Sumatra. Instability in Somalia for the past two decades gave birth to the world’s biggest piracy threat. The Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s was another occasion when vital oil trade was severely affected and required a concerted effort from a number of countries to limit the damage. India has an intrinsic stake in the stability of the northern IOR and its immediate neighbourhood since instability in these regions has a cascading effect on India itself. The past has seen political disturbance in littoral states like Sri Lanka and Myanmar spilling over to India through the
sea route. Indian maritime security forces then had to conduct dedicated operations to combat this menace, like the Indian intervention in the Maldives in 1988 to foil a coup d’État.

**Piracy**

Somalia based piracy has caused universal worry to the international fraternity since the late 1990s and it is only collective action by the international community that has led to a reduction in piracy attacks. India has not only escorted numerous merchant ships of all countries but concerted efforts of its maritime security forces has ensured that this piracy, which had spread its wings as far east as the Lakshadweep and Maldives islands, has been controlled and the erstwhile High Risk Area was moved further west of India in October 2015. However, political instability in Somalia coupled with any reduction in counter piracy efforts can cause its resurgence. While Somalia based piracy has shown a downward trend, statistics have shown an increase in piracy, largely robberies carried out at anchorages, off the coast of Bangladesh, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Though anti-piracy action by the international community may not be warranted, actions by the littoral nations are necessary. The recent decision by the governments of Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines for joint patrolling is a step in the right direction, which will deter these pirates and assuage the fears of the international maritime community. India’s commitment to anti-piracy efforts in the IOR has been underlined by efforts like the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, which was started by the Indian Navy in 2008, and has found traction with all the Indian Ocean states in generating mechanisms and procedures for combating these threats.

**Trafficking**

The Indian Ocean Region is regrettably home to the world’s most notorious areas of drug production, the Golden Crescent and the Golden Triangle. The trans-national networks established by the drug smugglers also serve as conduits for other destabilising activities like gunrunning and human trafficking. Myanmar has suffered from these twin troubles in large measures as also other countries of the littoral. These networks tend to use the sea route because of its vastness with its inherent opacity to surveillance. The interdictions of the Indian Coast Guard in the past few years reveal a rising trend of this nefarious activity. Political disturbance and oppression further add to this already hazardous mix with the ensuing cascading effects manifesting themselves in India’s internal security, forcing India to intervene on occasion.
Maritime Terrorism

The Indian Ocean has had relatively few incidents of maritime terrorism but the potential exists. The al-Qaeda attack on the French tanker, the Limburg, off Yemen, in October 2002, was one such. India’s huge coastline of more than 7500 km, a thriving maritime commercial community along its coast with nearly 200,000 fishing boats and a fishermen population of 4 million make the job of monitoring maritime activity an unenviable task.21 The ability of adversarial interests to exploit this vast maritime activity for launching attacks on land is therefore quite high, as was witnessed in the 26/11 terrorist acts at Mumbai, which were abetted by an inimical state. The attempted hijacking of a Pakistan Navy frigate Zulfiquar, in Sep 2014, by the al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) for possibly carrying out attacks against US Navy ships added a new dimension to this threat.22 The ramifications of such incidents on the Indian state have already been witnessed and the potential for further damage exists, especially in the present frayed geo-political conditions of the sub-continent. India has put in place a comprehensive monitoring and reaction mechanism to deal with such threats, which has prevented any more events like the one at Mumbai in 2008. However, concerns remain as was witnessed last year when a boat carrying explosives was intercepted by the Coast Guard.23

Extra Regional Military Presence

The Indian Ocean has always been witness to the military presence of outside powers right from the advent of the Portuguese in the 15th century till the present day. While the colonial incursions were rooted in commercial interests, the current extra-regional military presence is intended to further strategic interests of various nations. The ongoing international naval effort while critical to curbing the menace of piracy has also benefited nations in terms of operational intelligence gained and an expanded military maritime footprint. Deployments of submarines, like the Dutch and the Chinese to the region, serve no purpose other than to gain operational expertise and raise tensions in this area. The expanding Chinese Navy and its acquisition of a base at Djibouti,24 access facilities in Malaysia,25 and the ‘surreptitious’ base at Gwadar, albeit for justifiable logistic reasons, further exacerbate this situation. The Maritime Silk Road announced by the Chinese President in 2013 is also viewed by many as a ‘disguise for China’s military ambitions’.26 The opacity of Chinese policy and less than comfortable assurances on contentious issues coupled with the existing disputes with India has further widened an already existing trust deficit, further provoking security concerns.
Illegal Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing

IUU fishing is a major problem for marine communities around the world and governments of coastal states are severely challenged in enforcing international and national maritime laws to control this activity. A World Wildlife Fund report on illegal fishing has found that 87 percent of the fish stocks surveyed in the Western and Eastern Indian Ocean were experiencing high levels of IUU fishing. This is a major cause for concern, especially when viewed in the light of what the Somali President stated, in an op-ed, ‘...the encroachment of IUU fishing vessels sparked a wave of piracy in Somalia that cost the global maritime shipping industry billions of dollars in lost revenue’.27 Many ASEAN countries have also faced this problem, especially from Chinese fishing vessels.28 The Indian Ocean has also seen such activity in the recent past with an NGO, Sea Shepherd, reporting a fleet of IUU fishing vessels, south of the Andamans, in March 2016.29 Indian maritime zones have not witnessed many incidents of IUU fishing though there have been unconfirmed reports of fishing trawlers, mainly from Bangladesh and Taiwan, illegally entering India’s territorial waters in the Bay of Bengal.30 The focus on coastal security after the Mumbai attacks, has been a major deterrent to IUU fishing on account of the intensified patrolling by maritime security agencies. However, the high seas as also coastal zones of smaller neighbouring nations remain extremely vulnerable to this threat. India has provided naval assets for conducting patrolling of the EEZ of smaller nations like Seychelles and Mauritius in recent times, which has helped augment their maritime security capabilities.31

Most of the threats outlined above are transnational in nature and require the cooperation of a number of regional as also extra-regional stakeholders in collaborating and developing mechanisms to combat their proliferation. However, the Indian Ocean does not have overarching security architecture. A look at the existing security architecture of the region will enable the reader to better understand the responsibilities that India will need to shoulder as a regional leader in the IOR.

Regional Security Architecture in the IOR

India has always espoused a cooperative approach and participation of all states in promoting maritime security in the IOR as enunciated by PM Narendra Modi in his vision of SAGAR – Security And Growth for All in the Region.32 The IOR has a number of arrangements in this sphere, which are either restricted to countries or sub-regions. A glance at some of these arrangements will provide an indicative overview of their capabilities as also their shortfalls.
Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA)

The IORA was launched in 1997 for promoting intra-regional economic cooperation and development. However, the Charter of the IORA is a less-than-treaty level document and is, therefore, not legally binding on the signatories. The IORA now has six priority areas to promote the sustained growth and balanced development of the region out of which maritime safety and security is the first priority. It has also emphasised that maritime security and safety, and disaster management should be aligned with, and complement a possible IONS (Indian Ocean Naval Symposium) initiatives in these areas. However, it neither has a working group to deliberate on these issues nor an institutional link with IONS.

Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS)

The Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) is a voluntary initiative formed in 2008 that seeks to increase maritime co-operation among navies of the littoral states of the Indian Ocean Region. The IONS also aims to establish a variety of multinational maritime cooperative mechanisms designed to mitigate maritime security concerns among members. However, this is a purely naval initiative and is therefore hampered by an absence of governmental obligation to adhere to the Charter of the IONS.

Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP)

The ReCAAP is a regional government-to-government agreement, brought into force in September 2006 to promote and enhance cooperation against piracy and armed robbery in Asia. It is a multilateral agreement comprising 20 countries from Asia, Europe, USA, and Australia. The ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre (ISC) facilitates the dissemination of piracy-related information but does not have a mandate to initiate direct action nor is it incumbent on the signatories to take action for enhancing maritime security.

ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)

The objectives of the ASEAN Regional Forum are to foster dialogue and consultation on political and security issues of common interest and make efforts towards confidence-building and preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region. There has been a reasonable degree of success in these two main objectives though the same degree of success has not been seen in the efforts of ASEAN with China, since China has largely abjured from multilateral resolution of disputes.
The IOR consequently does not have a pan-regional maritime security structure wherein all the major stakeholders are involved. The diversity of the region and the geographical expanse also precludes development of an all-encompassing security architecture. Hence, there is a case for regional leaders to take the mantle in addressing common security imperatives of the region to infuse the required impetus towards generating a regional security construct.

**Mitigating India’s Maritime Security Concerns**

India’s increasing economic might and rising regional status necessitate assumption of ‘our responsibility to shape its (IOR) future’ in the words of PM Narendra Modi. India has also emphasised the responsibility of regional states in maintaining peace, stability and prosperity in the Indian Ocean. However, the inherent weaknesses of the regional states and the nature of the threats require a concerted effort from India to mitigate these threats. The cooperative approach adopted by India on issues of regional development underpinned by a guarantee of security will serve to not only address India’s own national concerns but also the littoral at large.

**Regional Maritime Security Framework**

An overarching security framework for the entire IOR may not be an implementable proposition considering the current geopolitical scenario and the development levels of the littoral states. Existing organisations like the IORA and IONS have elements of maritime security included in their charter. India can work towards cajoling participating governments into strengthening the IORA and creating inherent linkages with IONS to ensure effective implementation of actions for strengthening maritime security. While the IORA is not a treaty, member states should undertake agreed measures and initiate actions as decided at common fora. Simultaneously, initiatives like the Trilateral Maritime Security Cooperation have to be given a sustained impetus and also widened to include other stakeholders for dealing effectively with challenges emerging from the maritime sphere.

**Fostering Close Ties with Nations at Choke Points**

Control of shipping and trade at the choke points by inimical interests is unlikely in today’s world considering the stakes involved and the geopolitical linkages between states. However, disruption of trade, as witnessed during the Iran-Iraq war, can have debilitating effects. It is therefore, important to build strategic relationships with littoral nations in such regions to ensure
unhindered and unimpeded flow of Indian trade and shipping for continued economic progress. Such relations will also provide tactically significant information about potential adversarial interests transiting these areas, especially in moments of crises. For a start, India needs to enhance its relations with Indonesia in the maritime sphere even as Indonesia seeks to be a key player with its Global Maritime Fulcrum initiative.

**Maritime Exchanges**

In the absence of regional or sub-regional security architecture, bilateral and multi-lateral exchanges like the MILAN series of exercises, in all spheres of the maritime security domain, between concerned agencies of the various littoral nations of the IOR, can be mooted by India. These should be institutionalised in terms of regularity of conduct as also connectivity between agencies to ensure a high degree of coordination for achievement of concrete results. Such exchanges and regular contact between these agencies will aid in curbing of illegal activities like trafficking, gun running, smuggling, etc.

**Information Exchange**

Mechanisms and protocols for exchange of tactically important information and intelligence need to be put in place for interdiction and prosecution of vessels and persons engaged in illegal activities. Exchange of such intelligence will permit coordinated tracking of such activity across maritime zones and territorial waters, thereby ensuring effective prosecution. India already has agreements with a number of countries for exchange of white shipping information. Such exchanges have to be not only maintained but also increased with countries across the region.

**Common Operational Grid**

Effective management of the maritime domain, especially across a complex region like the IOR, requires a common operational grid amongst the littoral nations. International maritime practices and existent procedures already provide a huge database of marine information regarding vessels and facilities through systems like the Automatic Information System (AIS) and the Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS). In addition, various states have national systems to provide critical information concerning maritime security. While the sensitivity of states to part with such information is understandable, filtered information concerning the littoral can be provided to the other states, which will enable development of a fused and comprehensive
operative picture. Establishment of a common operational grid, which fuses information from systems like the AIS, and filtered information from national maritime security networks will enable better coordination between the various national maritime security agencies and greatly enhance their operational efficiency.

**Coordinated Patrols**

The Indian Navy carries out coordinated patrols with Thailand and Indonesia on a bilateral basis. The ICG also has MoUs with a number of countries for cooperation on maritime issues, which include joint exercises. However, due to the small size and limited capacities of many of the littoral countries, effective patrolling of the contingent EEZs is not always possible. Pooling of assets between the various states and a multi-lateral approach could alleviate the problems and improve monitoring of these zones.

**Anti-Piracy**

The ongoing multi-national effort in the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia has nearly eradicated piracy in this area. The littoral navies of the region have neither the wherewithal nor the capability to maintain such sustained operations to combat this menace. The current geopolitical realities and the relations between the various states also preclude such a coordinated effort. It is therefore important that the international anti-piracy effort is continued till a more favourable climate is established in Somalia. India, meanwhile, needs to take the lead in the establishment of a sub-regional mechanism for the north-eastern IOR with the participation of Bangladesh and Myanmar to curb piracy, which has seen an upward trend in recent years. This mechanism will require participation and involvement of a host of actors from each nation including the coast guards and the police for effective monitoring and control.

India thus has an onerous responsibility being the largest nation in the IOR. This responsibility has to be also tempered with the current geopolitical realities and the aspirations of the other states. India’s historical, cultural and traditional linkages with many of these states will help accelerate development of mechanisms to bolster the maritime security for the region. However, it will require India to take the lead. This will also be in keeping with India’s desire to develop the IOR with a collaborative and cooperative approach from all the regional stakeholders as epitomised by the Prime Minister’s vision of SAGAR.
Notes:

7 Facts & Figures, Maritime India Summit 2016.
8 Ibid.
11 Prime Minister’s Address to the Joint Session of U.S. Congress, 08 Jun, 2016.
14 ICC IMB Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships, 01 January – 31 December 2015.
15 ‘High-Risk Area Boundary Shifted from India’s Coastline’, The Hindu, 09 Oct 15.
16 ICC IMB Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships, 01 January – 31 December 2015.
18 ‘Drugs, Guns and War in Myanmar’. Brian McCartan. The Asia Times, 04 Nov 09.
19 Interdictions by ICG, http://www.indiancoastguard.gov.in/content/1722_3_interdictions.aspx#.
21 Database on Coastal States of India, CCZMCS, MoEF, GoI.
23 ‘Pak Boat Carrying Explosives Blows Up Near Gujarat After Interception By Coast
Guard’, Hindustan Times, 02 Jan 15.


25 ‘Malaysia to Allow PLA Navy Use of Strategic Port’, The Straits Times, 22 Nov 2015.


32 PM Modi’s Speech Commissioning of Mauritius CG Ship Barracuda, 12 Mar 2015.

33 White shipping information refers to exchange of relevant advance information on the identity and movement of commercial non-military merchant vessels.

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