

## BOOK REVIEWS

Rajendra K. Jain (Ed.), *India, Europe and Pakistan* (New Delhi, 2017, K W Publishers), Pages: 318, Price: 1,280.00

In the Preface to *India, Europe and Pakistan*, editor R K Jain underlines that, at present, 'Pakistan is at the cross roads' and facing a variety of domestic and external challenges. The subsequent thirteen chapters, contributed by Indian and European analysts and scholars, critically examine the nature of these challenges which could result in the reader concluding that Pakistan is a 'failed' - or 'failing' - State.

From a strategic and Indian perspective, one of the most significant narratives is Primit Pal Chaudhuri's analysis in Chapter 3 titled 'Decline of Kashmir in India-EU relations'. A foreign affairs and strategic specialist, Chaudhuri makes the valid point that the dissonance between India and the EU on Kashmir between 2000 and 2004 was because the EU's 'post-modern system' did not, as pointed out by former British diplomat Robert Cooper, "emphasise sovereignty or the separation of domestic and foreign affairs". He writes that, in contrast, India 'is a post-colonial state', in an advanced and continuing process of nation building. While India saw dialogue as one of several instruments in a broader strategy of handling both domestic insurgency and Pakistan, the EU's approach was to see dialogue as a constant factor which could not be turned on and turned off, depending on circumstances. The climax came at the 3rd India-EU Summit in Copenhagen, Denmark, in 2002 when Rasmussen, in his capacity as Danish Prime Minister and EU President (pre-Lisbon Treaty) stated that while there was no agreement on Kashmir and hence no mention in the Joint Statement, he would urge all parties in the conflict "to find a peaceful solution". In response, in a separate briefing, a furious Indian side noted that the EU had declined to make any reference to "Pakistan's support for cross-border terrorism in Kashmir". The author points out that since 2008, the Kashmir issue has never been publicly discussed by the two sides. EU Ambassadors who visit Kashmir annually have distanced themselves from separatists groups. In 2011, the EU Ambassador said of Kashmir: "There are some issues which you have to settle by yourselves". The author concludes by quoting Indian diplomats who believe that, since 2008, Europe has become increasingly inward looking, with a visible waning of the earlier notion that Europe was a major player in global diplomacy.

Stefano Gatto, who served in India before becoming Deputy Head of the EU Delegation in Pakistan, provides an interesting analysis of the complex relationship between Pakistan and the EU. He makes the valid point that while India regards the EU almost exclusively as an economic actor without much strategic importance (possibly due, in his view, to India's reservation regarding 'shared sovereignty' implicit in the Lisbon Treaty), Pakistan gives more strategic importance to these relations. However, one cannot agree with his perspective that because of the "ambivalent relationship between USA and Pakistan", the EU remains more popular in Pakistan because of its "more respectful" approach to Islamic culture. This ignores the rise of Islamophobia in Europe, along with anti-Muslim right wing parties, partly due to the migrant crises and the series of terrorist strikes within EU boundaries perpetuated by Islamic fundamentalists. EU today has the same reservations as US President Trump's Administration but voices them differently. For this reason, Gatto's conclusion that the relations between the EU and Pakistan have been "evolving favourably" in recent years would need to be re-examined in the context of contemporary developments.

Professor Ajay Darshan Behera, Coordinator of the Centre for Pakistan Studies at Jamia Millia Islamia University, examines the domestic and external challenges as well as other difficult choices facing Pakistan today. These include its fragile political stability, challenges from the military, its precarious security situation, the rise of non-state actors, and the continuing terrorist attacks within Pakistan. He believes that the consequence of the excessive focus by the military on India "as an existential threat" has precluded Pakistan from understanding or addressing a range of complex challenges within itself. He concludes on a pessimistic note, questioning the actual strength of Pakistan's fragile, democratic political institutions to shape up to these threats or to make the difficult choices required to shape its future. He makes the important point that Pakistan has to change its self perception and "view itself from the perspective of geo-economics rather than geo-politics". He adds that the Pakistani military also needs a new security discourse where India is not an existential threat, and where while addressing Pakistan's insecurities, those of India and Afghanistan are also taken into account. One could question his conclusion that the CPEC would have a positive influence on Pakistan and its military in this context.

In his analysis of the EU's experiment in democracy building and its promotion in Pakistan, Professor Jain highlights the EU's continuing internal debate on its policy towards Pakistan. Like other aspects of EU foreign policy, its shifting positions towards Pakistan demonstrate the continuing struggle

between pragmatists led by the Commission and ideologues led by the European Parliament. The latter continues to insist that the focus should remain on strengthening democracy and the rule of law. While Jain has noted that the key problem areas are Islamic extremism and unequal economic development, he has not highlighted the retrograde role of Pakistan's military and its ISI in undermining Pakistan's civilian governments. Instead, he seems to sympathise with the notion of some analysts that modern democracy has been "transplanted" in South Asia, and that the Western "liberal democratic paradigm" has been inadequate in challenging the complexity of religio-cultural and ethnic identities in the region.

Jean-Luc Racine, the eminent French scholar writing on the complex geopolitics of India and Pakistan notes that the bilateral relationship is "somewhat subdued". This is largely, he believes, because of the withdrawal of French forces from Afghanistan. The second reason could be the "increasing momentum" in Indo-French relations. He notes correctly that the relationship has gone beyond 'hyphenation'. He suggests that France is deeply concerned with the consequences of the rise of extremism, and feels impelled to contribute, whenever possible, to the stabilisation of Pakistan, including through soft power. There is no strategic partnership as with India. On Kashmir, France has stressed 'non-interference', and a 'dialogue based process' between India and Pakistan. While the article is somewhat dated, covering events till only 2013, one would agree with Racine's conclusion that for France, Pakistan's quest for parity with India appears less and less valid, or even counterproductive. Indeed, France continues to see Pakistan as a 'pole of instability', both internally and externally.

Professor Krishnamurthy from Pondicherry University, in the chapter titled 'The UK and Pakistan', has provided some interesting perspectives on the history of bilateral relations between these two countries post Partition. It provides important inputs into the radicalisation of the Pakistani Diaspora of the later generations. Unfortunately, the analysis is confined to developments till 2015. An analysis of the impact of Brexit on Pakistan-EU relations would have been useful and timely. With the Mayor of London, Sadiq Khan, being of Pakistani origin and anti Brexit, the author could have also referred to how Brexit will shape the future of the Pakistani Diaspora in the UK. It is difficult to support the conclusion that the UK drives the EU policy towards Pakistan. Even if UK once had some leverage, the author should have included the scenario post-Brexit – that is, after UK's divorce from the EU!

Hartmut Elsenham, an eminent German political scientist, has described relations between Pakistan and the EU as "practically a non-event". This is in

stark contrast to Stefano Gatto's analysis. He suggests that there is no substantive convergence of interests between Pakistan - "a state struggling with non-achieved nation-building" - and the EU which is a "not yet fully emerged structure between a state and post-national entity". According to Elsenham, both sides agree that the political and strategic relationship is not "of real importance" while economic ties are limited. He also highlights that the crisis in Ukraine has greatly weakened Pakistani efforts to internationalise the Kashmir issue by insisting on the right of self-determination. His advancing of the German example after World War II of accepting its existing boundaries and being a "good neighbour" for its former enemies, along with economic development, as an alternative political narrative for Pakistan to follow, appears to be too optimistic and simplistic. It does not take into account the present state of Pakistani domestic politics, with a greatly weakened civilian government, the role of non-state actors, and the ISI in pushing Pakistan to an almost self-destructive mode.

Shanti Mariet D'Souza, an Indian security analyst, attempts a response to the nature of 'Pakistan/NATO relations'. Meticulously researched in the context of Pakistan's crucial role in the Afghanistan operations post 9/11, she notes correctly that with the withdrawal of forces from Afghanistan, there would be a transformation in NATO's relations with Pakistan, with much less incentive for close cooperation in the future.

The volume contains revised and edited papers presented at an international conference in Jawaharlal Nehru University in March 2015. Many current developments which impact India, EU, and Pakistan relations are absent. These include Brexit, President Trump's withdrawal from Europe, a diminishing Trans-Atlantic alliance as well as the weakening of the democratic and civilian government in Pakistan to the detriment of regional peace and security, and to relations with India and the EU. It is, however, a valuable addition to existing scholarship on EU and South Asia, providing contributions by an impressive and regionally balanced set of analysts and scholars. It is a 'must read' for students of international relations, strategic thinkers, and diplomats who have an abiding interest in these issues.

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P. R. Kumaraswamy, *Squaring the Circle: Mahatma Gandhi and the Jewish National Home* (New Delhi, Knowledge World, 2017), Pages: 234, Price: Rs. 920.00

The Arab-Israel conflict has not only dominated global politics and international diplomacy for long but in recent years sympathy or antipathy towards the Palestine has also become a litmus test of political ideology, political correctness and political pragmatism for nations. The same stands true for India.

When it comes to identifying or defining India's association with the cause of Palestine or its relationship with Israel, we in India have not moved beyond the testament-like statement of Mahatma Gandhi made in 1938 in *Harijan*, which says, "Palestine belongs to the Arabs in the same sense that England belongs to the English and France to the French". (pp 135)

Here comes an intellectual intervention by Prof. P. R. Kumaraswamy, Professor at the Centre for West Asian Studies, JNU, who has made a pioneering effort not only to decode the meaning of Gandhi's statement but has also conducted an empirical survey of the political, religious and strategic constraints or motivation behind the statement that in common parlance is seen as an ardent disapproval of Zionism by Gandhi and a sign of unending love for Palestine, in his latest book, "Squaring the Circle: Mahatma Gandhi and the Jewish Home". .

Since the centrality of the book is Gandhi's disposition and orientation towards the idea of Jewish homeland, the author before digging deep into the political, religious and strategic factors shaping Gandhi's insensitivity towards the redemption of the Jewish homeland, travels into Gandhi's African years (1893-1914) and identifies his Jewish companions who might have left some imprint on his earlier notion of Judaism and later Zionism. The author traces his earlier acquaintance with Judaism in Africa to his two prominent companions, Mr. Kallenbach (a wealthy man) and Mr. Henry Solomon Leon Polak (a journalist). Mr. Kallenbach was Gandhi's "alter ego" and was the owner of Tolstoy Farm established by Gandhi (Pp 55). Gandhi addressed him as "my dear lower house" and Mr. Kallenbach in turn reciprocated by addressing Gandhi as his "upper house" (Pp 56). Mr. Kallenbach can be perceived as his friend who was first a Jew and later a transformed Zionist when both met again in 1937 in India after 23 years. Mr. Kallenbach failed to educate Gandhi on Judaism or Zionism. Instead, he was influenced by Gandhi when the latter dissuaded the former from going to Palestine. The author blames his two early companions for his disenchantment with the political

cause of Jews because they were non-practising Jews and had limited knowledge of the Jewish religion, which deprived Gandhi of accumulating substantial knowledge about Jews and Judaism.

Unlike Mr. Kallenbach, Mr. Henry Solomon Leon Polak was more a disciple than a friend and it was through Polak that the Indian nationalist leaders came to know about Gandhi's activities and accomplishments in South Africa. Mr. Polak visited India twice, in 1909 and in 1911, and met many prominent leaders of the Congress. There were other Jews too, namely, Mr. A. E. Shohet and Ms. Sonja Schlesin. While the former had published a rebuttal to Gandhi's article written in November 1938, the latter had served as Gandhi's secretary in South Africa.

The issue of Palestine had gripped the political consciousness of Indian leaders amidst the freedom movement and to prevent the linkage between Indian Muslims and the issue of Palestine; as the Zionist leadership made five separate attempts to persuade Gandhi to make a statement in favour of their cause.

The primary thesis or hypothesis of the book is the explication of political constraints and oversensitivity towards the religious minority for political gains, which shaped Gandhi's notion about the Jewish homeland. The demonstration of political constraints or ideational selectivity is well reflected in Gandhi's overarching involvement in Khilafat movement in an endeavour to win the hearts of the Muslims. Gandhi's rhetoric for the cause of Palestine is further driven by growing Muslim League (ML)-Congress political warfare to sway the Muslims. This was done by acting more loyal to Palestine than the Palestinians themselves. Gandhi's lack of knowledge of Judaism, the taboo of Zionism and his urging the Jews to practise non-violence constitute three others templates, which make the author conclude that Gandhi's antipathy to the Jewish cause was not woven by the ethical or moral fabric of his political ideas but was more determined by his narrow political vision.

Gandhi overlooked the plight of the Jews and the rationality behind the demand for Jewish homeland due to his view of the Indian Muslims during the Khilafat movement. He felt that any overture to the Jews would have created a wedge between the Indian National Congress and the Indian Muslims. Gandhi was swayed by the Palestinian cause as an Islamic one under the influence of the Khilafat Muslim leadership who made Gandhi a hostage to their anti-Jewish Islamic polemics. Gandhi acting as an astute politician recognised the gravity of the Khilafat Movement for the Indian Muslims. In

March 1920 he observed, “Khilafat is a question of life and death” (pp 79). The Balfour Declaration of 1917 had further annoyed the Muslims and Gandhi took it as an additional opportunity to galvanise the Hindu-Muslim unity.

It was merely power-politics, which overshadowed Gandhi’s thoughts on Judaism. It was not driven by his moralist or ethical stance as perceived by many. Both camps had joined a new political turf to woo the Muslims either to prove the secular credential or emerge as sole voice of Muslims by Congress and the ML respectively. Gandhi’s grave concerns for Hindu-Muslim unity and protecting the secular credentials would have suffered in case of any overt inclination towards the Jews or Zionism. Palestine had become the most dominant issue in the foreign policy agenda of the Congress and contextualisation of Palestine as an Islamic issue was a domestic compulsion for Gandhi (pp no. 130 and 158). Many of the Zionist-Congress meetings (including those with Nehru and Gandhi) that came to an end with the *Harijan* article of 1938, were kept secret fearing a backlash from the Muslims as Palestine and Zionism had become a topic for ideological contestation between the ML and the Congress.

According to the author, it was not merely the politics of Khilafat or the ML-Congress rivalry but his unfamiliarity with Judaism and the enigma of Zionism that deterred Gandhi from exhibiting any sympathy to the Jewish homeland. His dearth of knowledge about Judaism proved fatal for Zionism. Gandhi failed to capture the link between the historic Jewish sufferings with the Zionist demand for a homeland (pp 163). As mentioned earlier, the author traces this deficit to Gandhi’s earlier companion who failed to enlighten Gandhi about Judaism or Zionism. For Gandhi, Palestine was a “Biblical conception” (pp 161) but he deprived the Jews of the same claim and rejected the religious claim of Zionism to Palestine (pp 162). Gandhi’s opposition to religion-based claims over Palestine was exclusively directed at Jews and not at the Muslims. For Nehru, Palestine was exclusively an imperial issue but for Gandhi it was a mixture of both depending on the political necessities of Gandhi. He also saw Zionism as an extension of Imperialism.

While talking of Palestine, Gandhi too, like many others, could not overcome the long-held enigma about Zionism. No doubt, the post-1938 phase witnessed many changes in Gandhi *vis-à-vis* the Jewish cause but he never saw Zionism as an answer to the Jewish plight. (pp 160) Gandhi was never ready to look at Jews beyond the concept of followers of a particular faith. Gandhi praised Zionism as “lofty aspiration” in its “spiritual” term but declared that if it meant reoccupation of Palestine, then Zionism has no attraction for him (pp 147). This was the anti-Zionist conviction, which did

not allow Gandhi to give any sovereign jurisdiction to the Jews in Palestine while the issue of sovereignty constituted an indissoluble part of the Zionist campaign in Palestine.

Gandhi's ignorance about the plight of the Jews in Europe and Gandhi's demand put forth to Jews to practise non-violence while overlooking the violence of others have captured the attention of the author. Gandhi exhorted the Jews to be loyal to the land of their birth and earn their livelihood where they were born but he did not know that Jews in Germany were not only being discriminated against, but were also being stripped of their citizenry. His insistence of Jewish non-violence, both against Hitler in Europe and in Palestine, proved to be his Achilles heel. His advocacy for non-violence was indicative of his complete unfamiliarity with the unfolding carnage in Hitler's Europe. Gandhi's ignorance is further enforced when he asked the German Jews to resist their deportation (pp 182). Further, the parallelism he drew between Churchill and Hitler is another sign of his ignorance.

Gandhi had declared himself a Muslim, a Parsi, a Christian, and a Jew (pp 17) but it is too difficult to evaluate the impact of these religions on his political thoughts. Among many factors, the author attributes Gandhi's lack of sympathy for the Jewish cause to his little knowledge of Judaism. However, one can question if it is necessary that knowledge of a particular religion should also make one support the political cause emanating wrongly from the said religion. Maulana Azad was an astute Islamic scholar of his time, a master of Hadith and Sharia. He vehemently opposed the idea of Pakistan, an Islamic cause for the ML.

There was nothing wrong if Gandhi could not see Jews beyond being people of a particular faith and perhaps he would have outnumbered others in anticipating the grave outcome of the politico-religious project of Zionism. Perhaps the author has not done justice to Gandhi by reducing ideology of Gandhi to the politics of Khilafat and ML-Congress rivalry, while ignoring his lifelong moralist and ethical principles.

Despite these inconsistencies, this volume is unique in many ways and will undoubtedly trigger new sensitivity and a fresh debate among scholars and the strategic community who have traditionally adhered to Gandhi's dictum of 1938. Given the quantum of information, the book can be a reference point for future research. Moreover, the author has made the book an easy read because of his lucid and coherent style. What further distinguishes the collection is the revelation of many unknown facts about Gandhi and his

confidants. The book provides a sea of information on various aspects of the evolving ties between India and Israel, which perhaps only an archive could have provided. It is a marvellous piece of research and no doubt through this book, Gandhi has been revisited and rediscovered.

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Gulshan Dietl, *India and the Global Game of Gas Pipeline*, (New York and London: Routledge, 2017), Price: Rs 695.00, pp.213

In the changing geopolitics of energy, gas is emerging as a game changer. Not only is it a cleaner fuel, but it is gaining market share on its competitive strength as well. The IEA's 2017 report estimates that, in the next five years, gas production and its demand will be growing faster than oil and coal. By 2022, gas demand will reach 4000 billion cubic meters (bcm) from 3630 bcm in 2016. What is significant is that about 90 percent of this demand is going to come from Asia. Thus, the great game is going to be played out on Asian turf. Furthermore, along with China, India will be the lead player. While the Chinese demand is estimated at 340bcm in 2022, with imports being 140 bcm, India will be consuming 80 bcm in 2022 compared to 5 bcm in 2016. Indian import dependence on gas is to the tune of 50 percent. Apparently, India has high stakes in the global gas market.

The global gas market is going through dynamic changes triggered by technological innovations. The Shale gas revolution, as it is popularly described, as well as technological fixes in LNG has altered the nature of the great game by bringing new players into the arena. With the advantage of the low breakeven price of Shale gas, the present US administration intends not only to make the country energy independent but also an energy dominant power. Its LNG export capacity is to go up from 12.4 bcm, to 96 bcm by 2020. It is competing with Qatar, Australia, and Russia in the LNG market in Europe, China, and

India. It is undermining the gains of countries like Iran and Iraq who have huge reserves but have yet to become players of consequence. Moreover, the LNG market itself is under transformation with the emergence of Floating Storage Re-gasification Units (FSRU) as the mode of transiting and transferring gas across distant markets. While LNG does provide the advantageous flexibility of global markets, economics does suggest that, in the regional market, pipelines have the advantage. This is precisely the focus of the volume under review. It looks at the geopolitics of pipelines in the context of regional players like Iran, Russia, and Turkmenistan.

The volume plays out in three sections. The first section contains an introduction and overview of natural gas as a source of energy, its geology, geography, and market in the first chapter; the second chapter of the section is about the three players Iran, Russia, and Turkmenistan, and deals with the politics and evaluation of gas pipelines as routes of transportation; the third section is about the Indian tragic story of a gas importing country, with no pipeline connectivity with the region despite huge debates on pipelines over the years. As background material, all three chapters are comprehensive, meticulously covering concerns like the security dimensions besides the comparative perspective of these countries regarding gas as instrument of foreign policy.

The three case studies - titled troika - provide the genesis, evolution, and the geopolitics of three pipelines. The case study of Iran spells out the resource profile of the country, its potential, domestic policy, and the export of gas through pipelines. The pipelines from Iran include the Iran-Armenian pipeline, the Iran-Turkey pipeline, the Iran-Oman pipeline, the Iran-Iraq-Syria pipeline, and Nabucco. Having examined in detail – that is, policy and the context of sanctions - the author concludes that the overall rating is not very positive. “Iran’s initiatives on gas pipelines have not always been successful,” is the assessment of the author.

The chapter on Russia is premised on its profile as an energy superpower. While it could be a matter of judgment, Russia has been a global player and, it has been projecting its profile as a major player in the game of late. The chapter provides a rich account of Russia’s resource endowment, its policies, the Soviet legacy, and its politics, especially with reference to the Ukraine theatre. There are nine major pipelines, of which seven export gas. The Nord Stream Pipeline is an illustration of regional politics where European perceptions have been at variance. The section on the South stream/Turkish pipeline provides insights into the contending and contesting interest of gas suppliers in the Turkish theatre. From the global perspective, the section on the Russian-Chinese pipeline proposal reveals the evolving dynamics of the global game. It is rightly analysed in the

context of the unfolding of post Cold War politics where China is the emerging power. The author thinks that the deal is a part of the “vision of Greater Asia” which stretches from Shanghai to St. Petersburg”

Turkmenistan may not be a player of the stature of Russia or Iran, but it certainly enjoys strategic salience due to its geopolitical positioning despite being land-locked. Surely without pipeline access, the country cannot monetise its resources. However, the fact that future demand will come from Asia, it attracts the attention of consumers like China and India. Being a part of the erstwhile Soviet Union, the gas supply is locked within the Turkmenistan-Russia-Ukraine pipeline. Thus, the country is trying to diversify its export routes. The pipeline from Gedaim, a town on the border of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, which carries gas to China is emerging as a vital route of gas export from the country. A pipeline through Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India is another project for exporting gas from the landlocked country.

The section on India provides an historical account of gas as the source of energy. After describing the deficit in terms of supply and demand as well as indigenous supplies, the chapter moves to analyse the geopolitics of gas pipeline projects. Gas pipelines in India have been more a domestic project than about external routes to transport it. This does not mean that it has never been thought of. In fact, the chapter talks of three such initiatives: the Iran-Pakistan-India- pipeline, popularly called as IPI; the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India pipeline or TAPI; and the Myanmar-Bangladesh-India pipeline. As observed by the author, all the three projects have been a victim of their own context.

From the Indian perspective, the significance of the great game lies in facilitating its transition to the commitment that it made in Paris Agreement. According to its Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC), India has put its goal at 33-35 percent reduction in emissions intensity (from the 2005 levels) by 2030. The government has also declared its aims of deriving 40 percent of energy from non-fossil fuel sources by 2030. Natural gas has to be a critical component in moving towards a low carbon economy. Since imports are going to be inevitable, pipelines are to be seen in a wider perspective through an innovative approach. Perhaps the study should have given some thought to this. Apparently, the obstacles in pipeline projects are going to make India look for LNG. According to the government reports, “the total re-gasification capacity of four R-LNG terminals has increased to 22 MMTPA (79.2 MMSCMD). The capacity of these 4 R-LNG terminals is likely to be increased further to 32.5 MMTPA (117 MMSCMD) by 2016-17.” Three more terminals are under construction, another three are planned, and five more

are proposed, taking the total capacity to 72.5MMTPA. With LNG gaining place in Indian gas imports, the great game in the global LNG turf is going to be the future of energy diplomacy.

The volume is distinct in terms of its scope, narrative, and analysis. It is a good addition to literature on the subject, which is very scanty. It is valuable for those who are interested in understanding the great game of global gas pipelines.

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Gurmeet Kanwal, *Sharpening the Arsenal: India's Evolving Nuclear Deterrence Policy*, (Harper Collins, New Delhi, 2017), Pages: 272, Price: Rs. 599.00

Gurmeet Kanwal, one of India's foremost military analysts, has been thinking and writing about India's nuclear policy for over two decades. That makes his voice one of the most authoritative on the subject, outside of the government. His latest offering can be seen as a continuation of his previous book on India's nuclear policy, *Shaping the Arsenal*. This is a thoughtful and excellent contribution to the ongoing debate about India's nuclear doctrine that hopefully India's decision-makers would take note of.

Here, Kanwal covers all the key issues and debates around India's nuclear arsenal, outlining India's current status and its options on a whole host of key issues. Kanwal comes out of the K. Subrahmanyam/Jasjit Singh school of nuclear policy which strongly advocates a limited nuclear force mated to a No First Use doctrine under tight control, monitored and commanded by the civilian leadership, even if operationally under the control of the military. Nevertheless, even those who advocate a limited nuclear arsenal cannot but be concerned by the glacial pace of the development of India's strategic capabilities. More than three decades after the Indian ballistic missile programme was initiated, India still does not have a missile with sufficient range to cover all of China, its principal adversary. Considering that the distance from the southern tip of India to the farthest point in China is about 6800 kilometres,

and that the effective range of ballistic missiles is 70-90 percent of their total range, India would need a missile with a range of about 8000 kilometres for effective deterrence coverage of China, which it does not have yet.

It is unclear whether this is the consequence of a political decision to keep the Indian capability limited, or of India's technical insufficiency, though the latter seems a bit hard to believe. The US and the Soviet Union took just about a decade to develop their intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capability, with far lesser technological base in the 1950s. China took only a bit longer to develop its first ICBM, the DF-4. Even North Korea seems well on its way to developing its ICBM capability. Whatever the reason for India's very slow development of its capabilities, India's nuclear deterrence capability clearly suffers. Kanwal's frustration on this count is perfectly understandable.

Kanwal argues that Pakistan's tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) are destabilising and ineffective. There is considerable concern in India, obviously, about Pakistan's TNWs, with some opinions even suggesting that India should develop its own TNWs. Kanwal vehemently opposes this, in my opinion, correctly. However, Pakistan's development of TNWs is perfectly understandable from a deterrence perspective. As the smaller, weaker conventional power, Pakistan has little choice but to adopt riskier strategies to keep the stronger side, that is India, off balance. They have succeeded in doing this partly because India seems to have bought the Pakistani bluff that it will use TNWs. It is difficult to imagine Pakistan using any nuclear weapon, including TNWs, unless its very survival is at threat. It certainly makes little sense for Pakistan to use TNWs simply to stop an Indian military incursion a few dozen kilometres into Pakistani territory. The threat has definitely been effective because it has deterred India, even though I seriously doubt that Pakistan will actually follow through if such contingency arises. As Kanwal suggests, India should be prepared to call this bluff.

On the other hand, the likelihood of India following through on its own promise of massive retaliation is also somewhat suspect, especially in a context where Pakistan only conducts a limited strike on its own territory, against an intruding Indian military force. Kanwal is hopeful that India will stick to its doctrine. But India may need to develop more flexible options between not responding at all and a full-scale massive attack on Pakistani cities. This does not require India to build TNWs: Kanwal is correct to emphasise all the problems that TNWs have with regard to safety, security, command and control. However, India can consider tactical nuclear response without building TNWs, by using air-delivered nuclear gravity bombs of sufficiently low yield. This would eliminate all the problems associated with TNWs and at the same

time provide India with the means to respond other than letting loose with its entire nuclear arsenal.

India could reduce the risk of escalation even further, by refocusing its Cold Start doctrine. Instead of attempting multiple armoured attacks along the plains, India could attempt to seize territory in Pakistan occupied Kashmir. This would be both, a significant punishment, more justifiable (since this is disputed territory that India does not have to give back) and less risky because Pakistan may be more reluctant to use nuclear weapons on Kashmir, considering its possible effect on its own claims on Kashmir.

Kanwal also considers possible Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) to further reduce the risk of nuclear escalation. Nuclear escalation itself is an overblown concern: the type of nuclear forces that India and Pakistan have do not carry the same risk of the kind of automatic escalation that was feared in the US-Soviet context cold war dyad. There, the possibility of rapid escalation was a real concern because of the fear that political leaders could not possibly halt the process once it started because of time and other pressures. In other words, there was a strong possibility that escalation could be undeliberated and nearly automatic (though even this was probably an exaggeration). But in the case of small nuclear forces such as those of India and Pakistan, escalation will necessarily have to be deliberate – and therefore, politically controllable.

Still, there is little wrong in considering CBMs if they work to reduce the nuclear danger. However, one cannot be sure that Pakistan will necessarily accept CBMs such as de-mating, partly because their deterrence strategy is based on the risk of escalation. Removing the escalation risk will reduce their deterrence capacity by making it safer for India to use its conventional military strength. Pakistan has little interest in that. Moreover, the issue of verification of any such CBM raises a host of problems. Finally, Kanwal correctly identifies India's problem of lack of credibility. This remains one of the most serious problems that India faces, one that is not confined to the nuclear arena.

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